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I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2015, the country saw a sea change in the rights of
same-sex couples to marry.1 With Obergefell v. Hodges, the United States
Supreme Court made clear that states could not prohibit same-sex marriage.2
Obergefell created ripple effects in a number of doctrinal areas, including
inheritance law.3
From an inheritance law perspective, Obergefell raises questions about
the current nature of the marital presumption.4 That doctrine—that a child
born during an intact marriage is presumed to be the child of the husband—
does significant work in inheritance law.5 The marital presumption provides
an efficient resolution of the central question for probate courts in estate
administration—is there a parent-child relationship between the decedent and
a person claiming a share of the decedent’s estate?6 Every state has a version
of the marital presumption and, although it is no longer irrebuttable in the
vast majority of states, it is still a powerful presumption that resolves the
question in the majority of cases.7
 Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law; B.A., Yale College 1980; J.D.
University of Virginia 1983. The author would like to thank Susan G. McCarty and Jason Hawkins for
their research assistance.
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See discussion infra Parts III–IV (analyzing case law about the presumption).
6. See discussion infra Parts III–IV (analyzing case law about the presumption).
7. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204 (West 2015).
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With the advent of same sex-marriage as a right in every state, there are
a number of interesting questions about the future of the marital
presumption.8 Does Obergefell reify marriage and thus the presumption?9
And is that bad policy?10 For those who argue that the presumption privileges
marital children, should they redouble their efforts to eliminate the marital
presumption altogether?11 Should states revise statutes to reflect the fact that
a woman may now be the nonbirth spouse trying to establish a parent-child
relationship using a presumption built specifically for men? 12 Should those
in inheritance law separate the definition of the parent-child relationship for
their purposes from its definition for family law purposes?13
This article focuses on the last question—the role of the marital
presumption in inheritance law after Obergefell.14 It describes several
illustrative cases that have arisen in the family law context, reviews the
courts’ analysis, and suggests that a conclusive marital presumption be
extended to all nonbirth/nongenetic spouses for purposes of inheritance
law.15 Since our system of inheritance law is status-based, establishing the
parent-child relationship is the key to determining whether someone inherits
through intestacy or when there is a class gift in a governing instrument like
a will or trust.16 This article takes the position that Obergefell mandates
extension of the current presumption to same-sex, nonbirth/nongenetic
spouses in both family law and inheritance law.17
The goals of inheritance law in determining parentage include ensuring
a child has two parents from whom to inherit if possible, an efficient and fair

8. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584.
9. See Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 23 (2015) (arguing that Obergefell “reifies marriage as a key element in the social front of family,
further marginalizing nonmarital families.”). See also Joanna L. Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying
Parentage to Marital Status for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POLICY & L. 671, 703
(2012) (arguing that tying parental status to civil union or marriage created the risk that lesbian co-parents
would face greater restrictions on their ability to claim legal parentage status).
10. See generally id.
11. See generally infra Part II (discussing marriage and children).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Parts II–V.
15. See COURTNEY JOSLIN, SHANNON MINTER & CATHERINE SAKIMURA, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL
AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 5.22 (2015–2016 ed.) (summarizing the law to date). The cases
discussed herein are used merely to illustrate the kinds of analysis courts have applied to the question of
extending the marital presumption, and this article does not attempt to cover every state case in this regard.
See id. Note that I have previously made the argument for a separate definition of parentage for purposes
of family law and inheritance law. See Paula A. Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and Post-Death
Parentage: A Different Path for Inheritance Law?, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857 (2008).
16. Paula A. Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance be Linked?, 49 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 257 (1994).
17. See infra Part II.
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distribution of assets, and the prevention of fraudulent claims.18 These goals
are not completely aligned with the goal of family law, which is to select the
adult best suited to raise the child for a number of years.19 While this article
makes the case for the retention of the presumption, it also makes the case
for reconceptualizing the presumption from a doctrine that is a surrogate for
discovering a biological connection between fathers and children, to a
doctrine based upon the presumed consent of the nonbirth/nongenetic spouse
to be the parent of any child born during the marriage.20 In so doing, it argues
that this result can be reconciled with the second and third goals of the
original intent of the presumption, legitimizing children and protecting the
intact, marital family from intrusion.21 Those original goals are completely
consistent with Justice Kennedy’s focus in Obergefell on reducing the stigma
of children of same-sex couples.22
State courts, like the Iowa Supreme Court, faced this issue after
extending the right of marriage to same-sex couples.23 In Gartner v. Iowa
Department of Public Health, the court considered the question of whether
the traditional marital presumption should be extended to a female
nonbirth/nongenetic spouse two years after it extended the right to marry in
Varnum v. Brien.24 The Iowa Supreme Court decided that it could not
interpret the statute, using the existing rules of statutory construction, to
include both men and women.25 However, the Court found that the statute,
as applied, was unconstitutional, and thus the benefit of the statute must be
extended to female nonbirth/nongenetic spouses.26
Like the Iowa Supreme Court in Gartner, it is tempting to assume that
if the question came up in another state, Obergefell would lead that state court
to feel compelled to extend the marital presumption to nonbirth/nongenetic
female spouses.27 But, as seen with the next several cases, some courts have
refused to extend the presumption.28 This article first examines those cases,
and then the cases that have allowed the extension, arguing the latter is the
correct path.29

18. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977). See also
Paula A. Monopoli, AMERICAN PROBATE: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC, IMPROVING THE PROCESS (2003) at
13–14 (describing the goals and purposes of the American probate process more generally).
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra Part V.
21. Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 345–48 (Iowa 2013).
22. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
23. See Gartner,830 N.W.2d at 335.
24. Id.; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
25. See Gartner, 830 N.W.2d at 354.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Paczkowski v. Paczkowski, 10 N.Y.S.3d 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); Q.M. v. B.C., 995
N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014); Shineovich v. Shineovich , 214 P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
29. See infra Parts II–V.
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II. OBERGEFELL ON MARRIAGE AND CHILDREN
Justice Kennedy grounded his majority opinion in Obergefell in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection clauses.30 He
laid out four principles for protecting the right of same sex couples to marry
including individual autonomy, the right to enjoy intimate association,
safeguarding children and families, and the fact that marriage is the keystone
of our social order.31 Of the four bases for extending the right to marry to
same-sex couples, the third is most salient for the question of whether the
marital presumption must be extended to female nonbirth/nongenetic
spouses, now that the United States Supreme Court has extended the right to
marry.32
Justice Kennedy drew the third principle from cases like Pierce v.
Society of Sisters and Meyer v. Nebraska:
A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of
childrearing, procreation, and education. The Court has recognized these
connections by describing the varied rights as a unified whole: “[T]he right
to ‘marry, establish a home and bring up children’ is a central part of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” Under the laws of the several
States, some of marriage’s protections for children and families are
material. But marriage also confers more profound benefits. By giving
recognition and legal structure to their parents’ relationship, marriage
allows children “to understand the integrity and closeness of their own
family and its concord with other families in their community and in their
daily lives.” Marriage also affords the permanency and stability important
to children’s best interests.
....
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a
central premise of the right to marry. Without the recognition, stability, and
predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing
their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant material
costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of
their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws
at issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.33

Obergefell clearly reifies marriage and marital privilege.34 For those
who argue that the law should be moving in the opposite direction, one
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).
Id. at 2589–90.
Id. at 2600.
Id. at 2600–01 (citations omitted).
See id.
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alternative to the marital presumption is to move to a purely functional test
for parentage.35 This would no longer privilege marriage but, as I have
argued previously, it is inefficient for inheritance law.36 While functional
parentage makes more sense when the issue is who is the adult best suited to
raise the child, it is still more resource-consumptive than a parentage rule
based on status.37 A functional approach makes less sense when the issue is
simply to whom a decedent’s property will be reallocated at death.38 The
probate process needs more bright-line rules, given the few resources
afforded to probate courts in this country and the goals of the process, which
are to marshal assets, pay creditors, distribute to heirs or beneficiaries, and
close the estate as quickly as possible.39 This article looks at the barriers to
making the presumption gender-neutral, as well as the process of
reconceptualizing its foundations and moving from a model based on a
surrogate for biology to one of consent.40 It argues for retention of the marital
presumption for family law based on presumed consent, giving the nonbirth
spouse a chance to rebut the presumption based on lack of consent.41 This
article also argues for a conclusive presumption in the case of inheritance
law, given its different goals.42
For analytical purposes, this article first considers state cases that have
refused to extend the presumption to nonbirth/nongenetic spouses, and then
cases that have extended it.43 Even in the cases that extended the presumption
on constitutional grounds, there are statutory construction barriers that
warrant consideration.44 Those barriers may require corrective legislative
action to extend the presumption to same-sex spouses in order to guarantee
the gender neutral application of the presumption.45
III. CASES THAT HAVE NOT EXTENDED THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION TO
SAME-SEX NONBIRTH/NONGENETIC SPOUSES
It is instructive to begin by looking at the language in three opinions in
which state courts have refused to extend the marital presumption to samesex nonbirth/nongenetic spouses.46 These include Paczkowski v. Paczkowski

35. Monopoli, Nonmarital, supra note 15, at 859–60.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 868–99.
41. See id. at 881–88.
42. See id. at 897–99.
43. See infra Part III.
44. See infra Part III.
45. See infra Part III.
46. Paczkowski v. Paczkowski, 10 N.Y.S.3d 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); Q.M. v. B.C., 995
N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014); Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
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and Q.M. v. B.C. in New York, and Shineovich v. Shineovich in Oregon.47
These cases often analyze the rights of the nonbirth/nongenetic spouse as a
third party vis-à-vis the child as opposed to a parent.48
Paczkowski involved an appeal from the family court dismissing the
petition for joint custody of a child.49 The petitioner was the nonbirth/
nongenetic spouse in a same sex marriage.50 The court focused on the fact
that the petitioner could not possibly be the child’s biological parent because
she had not given birth to the child.51 In doing so, the court leaves the
petitioner in the status of a nonparent, third-party stranger to the child, despite
the fact that she was married to the child’s birth mother.52 The appellate
division found that the lower court properly dismissed the petition for lack of
standing:
A nonparent may have standing to seek to displace a parent’s right to
custody and control of his or her child, but only upon a showing that “the
parent has relinquished that right due to surrender, abandonment, persistent
neglect, unfitness, or other extraordinary circumstances.” Here, the
petitioner, who is neither an adoptive parent nor a biological parent of the
subject child, failed to allege the existence of extraordinary circumstances
that would establish her standing to seek custody. Contrary to the
petitioner’s contention, Family Court Act § 417 and Domestic Relations
Law § 24 do not provide her with standing as a parent, since the presumption
of legitimacy they create is one of a biological relationship, not of legal
status, and, as the nongestational spouse in a same-sex marriage, there is no
possibility that she is the child’s biological parent.53

Similarly, the family court in Q.M. v. B.C. reasoned that, regardless of
the marital status of the female couple, the fact that a man, who was not a
spouse of the birth mother, fathered the child distinguished this case from one
in which conception was the result of an anonymous sperm donation.54 Q.M.
v. B.C. involved a paternity action by a man who sought to be declared the
legal father of a child who was born to a woman, B.C., in a same-sex
marriage.55 B.C. and her wife, J.S., argued that their marriage itself should
give the nonbirth, nongenetic spouse legal parentage of the child via the
marital presumption.56 Thus, the paternity action should be dismissed.57 The
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Paczkowski, 10 N.Y.S.3d at 270; Q.M., 995 N.Y.S.2d at 470; Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 29.
Paczkowski, 10 N.Y.S.3d at 270; Q.M., 995 N.Y.S.2d at 470; Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 29.
Paczkowski, 10 N.Y.S.3d at 270–71.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 271 (citations omitted).
Q.M. v. B.C., 995 N.Y.S.2d 470, 473–74 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014).
Id. at 471.
Id.
Id.
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court disagreed.58 It noted that, “It has long been presumed that the child
born of a marriage was fathered by the husband. The presumption is
recognized at common law and codified in Domestic Relations Law § 24 and
Family Court Act § 417.” 59
The court goes on to note that, traditionally, mothers used the
presumption to hold fathers to their support obligations, and the focus was on
two things: (1) establishing that the child was legitimate in the eyes of the
law, and (2) giving the child both a father and a mother for legal purposes.60
However, the court noted that the world has changed and, given the advent
of same-sex marriage, cases have arisen in terms of whether a
nonbirth/nongenetic spouse is a child’s legal parent by virtue of the
presumption.61 The court cites Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M (discussed above)
for the proposition that most of these cases arise in the context of lesbian
couples who have a child through artificial insemination of the birth mother
with anonymous sperm.62 In that case, the court did find that the nonbirth/
nongenetic spouse was the legal parent via the marital presumption.63
Distinguishing the facts from Q.M. v. B.C., as the child was not the product
of artificial insemination using an anonymous sperm donor, the court said:
Here, the respondents seek to rely on the presumption of legitimacy to
establish Ms. S. as J.C.’s second mother, effectively extinguishing J.C.’s
right to have a father. Ms. C.’s credible and uncontradicted testimony at the
hearing was that she did not have sexual relations with any man other than
Mr. M. during the period of J.C.’s conception, and that Mr. M. is J.C.’s
father. Thus, there is no dispute that Ms. S. is not, and could not possibly
be, the second parent of this child. Moreover, Ms. S. reconciled with Ms.
C. after Ms. C. discovered she was pregnant, and presumably after she had
been told that the child was fathered by Mr. M.
Ms. C. argues that the rights of “non-biological parents” are entitled to
the same constitutional protections afforded biological parents and suggests
that the Marriage Equality Act requires that all spouses be treated in a
completely gender neutral manner. It is this court’s view that the Marriage
Equality Act does not require the court to ignore the obvious biological
differences between husbands and wives. For instance, as explained above,
Domestic Relations Law § 73 can be easily applied to same-sex female
married couples, but not to same-sex male couples, neither of whom are
able to bear a child. In the same vein, neither spouse in a same-sex female
couple can father a child. Thus, while the language of Domestic Relations
Law § 10–a requires same-sex married couples to be treated the same as all
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 473.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id. at 473.
Id.
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other married couples, it does not preclude differentiation based on essential
biology.64

Again, the problem, of course, is that if courts refuse to designate the
nonbirth/nongentic spouse as a legal parent, it leaves that parent with no
relationship to the child other than that of a third-party stranger.65 The court
acknowledges this troubling outcome, but it states:
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly declined to expand
the traditional definition of a parent beyond biological or birth parents and
adoptive parents. Specifically, the Court has rejected arguments that nonadoptive or non-biological third parties, such as Ms. S., should be granted
parental status based on a claim of a close relationship with the child.
As a result, Ms. S. stands in the position of many loving step-parents,
male and female, who are not legal parents and are not entitled to court
ordered custody or visitation with their step-children. The fact that she was
married to Ms. C. at the time of J.C.’s birth, under the facts here, does not
change her status.66

So, in essence, the court’s analysis is that the marital presumption only
applies in a case where there is an anonymous sperm donor and two female
spouses.67 If there is a biological father who is not an anonymous sperm
donor, that fact trumps the marital presumption in a case where two women
are validly married when the child is born.68
Finally, in Shineovich v. Shineovich, the Oregon Court of Appeals
reviewed a circuit court’s dismissal of a petition denying legal parentage to
the nonbirth/nongenetic spouse in a same-sex marriage.69 The case involved
a couple who married before the birth of their second child but whose
marriage was later declared invalid after a state referendum defined marriage
as between one man and one woman.70 In later separation proceedings, the
nonbirth/nongenetic spouse argued that she was the legal parent of the two
children born during the relationship, and that the marital presumption should
apply as Oregon’s policy was to extend all the benefits of marriage to
domestic partners.71 She challenged the constitutionality of the marital
presumption statute as applied, and the court said:

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 474.
See id.
Id. (citations omitted).
See id.
See id.
Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 35–36.
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We turn to petitioner’s arguments on the merits, beginning with her
contention that ORS 109.070(1) is unconstitutional. As she did before the
trial court, petitioner contends that the statute affords to married men a
privilege—the presumption of being the legal parent of the children of a
female spouse—that is not available to her because same-sex couples are
not permitted to marry. Accordingly, she argues, the statute violates the
right to equal privileges and immunities guaranteed by Article I, section 20,
of the Oregon Constitution.
Respondent argues, among other things, that the presumption created
by ORS 109.070(1) relates to biological paternity. Given that there is no
dispute about whether petitioner is P’s biological parent, she argues that the
statute cannot be applied to petitioner.
We agree with respondent. Even if the statute were broadened so as not
to exclude any individual from its reach on the basis of gender or marital
status, the presumption still would not apply to petitioner.72

Like the courts in Paczkowski and Q.M. v. B.C., the Shineovich court
focuses on the text of the statute and its intent in terms of excluding certain
husbands who cannot be biologically connected to a child born to that man’s
wife.73 The court takes great pains to point out that the statute, in its view,
seeks to determine biological paternity, in part because a man who is not
physically capable of fathering the child cannot be the legal parent of that
child under the terms of the statute:
To construe the statute, we begin by examining the text of ORS 109.070
(2003) in context. We may also consider its legislative history and, if
necessary, other interpretive aids. Here, the text, read in context, is
dispositive. ORS 109.070(1) (2013) creates a presumption as to who is the
biological parent of a child. By the very terms of the statute, for the
presumption of parentage to apply, it must be at least possible that the
person is the biological parent of the child. The purpose of ORS 109.070(1)
(2003) is to establish paternity. “Paternity” means “origin or descent from
a father” or “male parentage.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1654
(unabridged ed 2002). Even if the gender aspect of the word is disregarded,
“paternity” refers to the genetic relationship between parent and child. See
ORS 109.251 (defining “blood tests” to include “any test for genetic
markers to determine paternity”); Webster’s at 1654 (defining “paternity
test” as “a test to determine whether a given man could be father to a
particular child made by comparison of the blood groups of the mother,
child, and suspected man, a negative result proving that the man cannot be
the father while a positive result shows only that it is biologically possible
that he may be”). Indeed, the conclusive presumption of paternity does not
72. Id.
73. Id.
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apply to a married man who is not biologically capable of having conceived
a child borne by his wife: ORS 109.070(1)(a) (2003) provides, “The child
of a wife cohabiting with her husband who was not impotent or sterile at
the time of the conception of the child shall be conclusively presumed to be
the child of her husband.” (emphasis added).74

The court concludes that because the nonbirth/nongenetic partner
cannot possibly be the biological parent of the child at issue, there is no
constitutional infirmity because the presumption does not apply to those
persons who are not even conceivably biologically related to the child.75
Even if marital status or gender were removed, the statute would still not
apply to her.76 The court finds that she is not “entitled to a declaration of
legal parentage under the statute.” 77
IV. CASES THAT HAVE EXTENDED THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION TO SAMESEX NONBIRTH/NONGENETIC SPOUSES
Other state courts have come to a different conclusion; there are cases
where state courts have agreed to extend the marital presumption to samesex nonbirth/nongenetic spouses despite the marital presumption’s historical
foundation in biology.78
Barse v. Pasternak involved a dissolution of marriage action in which
the spouses sought custody of the child of the marriage.79 The trial court
awarded sole custody to the nongenetic/nonbirth spouse.80 After a number
of procedural appeals, the Superior Court took up the issue of whether the
nonbirth/nongenetic spouse was properly found to be the child’s legal parent
under the marital presumption where there had been no adoption of the
child.81 That court said that the common-law presumption of legitimacy, also
known as the marital presumption, was “well founded in Connecticut’s
common law.”82 The court noted the reciprocal nature of the determination
of parentage:
74. Id. at 36 (citations omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (Note that while the Shineovich court refused to confer legal parentage on the female nonbirth
spouse under the marital presumption statute, ORS 109.070(1) (2003), it went on to confer legal parentage
on the spouse under a separate statute, ORS 109.243, that confers legal parentage on the husband of a
woman who had undergone artificial insemination by extending that statute to include female nonbirth
spouses.
78. See, e.g., Barse v. Pasternak, No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jan. 16, 2015); Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014); Gartner v. Iowa
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013); Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2012).
79. Barse, 2015 WL 600973, at *1.
80. Id. at *1.
81. Id. at *1–2.
82. Id. at *8.
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The phrases “presumption of legitimacy” and “marital presumption” are
used interchangeably. “[T]he concept of ‘child of the marriage’ defines
who is a parent for purposes of awarding custody in a dissolution action.
The child of the marriage and the parent of the child are two sides of the
same coin.” In other words, if a minor child is “issue” or “child” of the
parties’ marriage, he or she is presumed to be legitimate (i.e., the
presumption of legitimacy), and the parties to the marriage are presumed to
be the legal parents of that child (i.e., the marital presumption).83

The Barse court sets the stage for its analysis by noting that this was a
case of first impression in Connecticut, having found no precedent for
whether the marital presumption should extend to same-sex marriages.84 The
court looked to Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health for some insight
into how to approach the novel question.85 Like Justice Kennedy in
Obergefell, the court focuses in particular on the benefits that flow to children
from allowing same-sex marriages:
In Kerrigan, the Supreme Court found that same-sex couples cannot
be denied the constitutional right to marry. In reaching this conclusion, the
court examined the economic and sociological implications of granting
same-sex couples, the right to marry. . . . The Supreme Court also noted the
positive effects that affording same-sex couples the right to marry would
have on children: “Because of the significance of marriage in our society,
the freedom to marry is an extraordinarily important right for all persons
who wish to exercise it. As the Alliance for Marriage acknowledged in its
amicus brief in support of the defendants, children reared by married
couples and married couples themselves benefit greatly from marriage—
apart from any legal benefits conferred on the family. Benefits to the
married couple include greater longevity, greater wealth, more fulfilling
sexual relationships, and greater happiness.” Further, “the ban on same sex
marriage is likely to have an especially deleterious effect on the children of
same sex couples. A primary reason why many same sex couples wish to
marry is so that their children can feel secure in knowing that their parents’
relationships are as valid and as valued as the marital relationships of their
friends’ parents. Excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage will not
make children of opposite-sex marriages more secure, but it does prevent
children of same-sex couples from enjoying the immeasurable advantages
that flow from the assurance of a stable family structure in which the
children will be reared, educated, and socialized.”86

The court went on to state that, given the clear mandate of Kerrigan, it
was bound to find that the common law presumption of legitimacy and the
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *9 (citations omitted).
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marital presumption applied to the children of same-sex married couples.87
After finding that the presumption applied, the court went on to address
corollary issues with regard to whether the birth spouse could be estopped
from rebutting the presumption, as a wife might be in an opposite-sex
marriage context if she sat on her rights and treated the husband as if he were
the father, and he suffered detriment as a result:
In Weidenbacher, the court held that the presumption of legitimacy is
rebuttable by a person “who presents clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence that the mother’s husband is not the child’s natural father.”
Applying this standard to the case at bar, the defendant can easily meet her
burden because the parties have stipulated that the plaintiff has no genetic
relationship to the minor child. Consequently, the court must consider
whether there are any circumstances under which the defendant may be
precluded from rebutting the presumption that the plaintiff is the minor
child’s legal parent. The plaintiff argues that such circumstances reside in
the law of equity, and in particular under the doctrine of equitable
estoppel.88

In an opposite-sex marriage, the presumption would typically be
rebutted by DNA evidence today.89 The court would order genetic testing
and, if the husband had no genetic link to the child, the court may determine
that he is not the legal parent.90 Courts do retain the equitable power to
declare that, even despite a genetic connection and the rebuttal of the
presumption, the child’s best interests require the husband to retain legal
parentage.91 The Barse court found that equitable estoppel is available as a
defense on the part of the nonbirth/nongenetic spouse in this case, but that
whether it applies in this case is a factual matter to be determined by a
separate, evidentiary hearing.92 However, the court does not address how to
rebut such a presumption by an admittedly nonbirth/nongenetic female
spouse. But the gravamen of such a rebuttal presumably lies in a lack of
consent to the artificial insemination procedure.93
The Barse court also addressed the consent requirements and whether a
failure to strictly adhere to those requirements automatically results in a
husband losing his presumptive parental status.94 Citing to a New York case,
W. v. W., the court noted that there may be issues of equity which defeat this

87. Id. at *10.
88. Id. at *11 (citations omitted).
89. See Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital
Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 253 (2006).
90. See id.
91. Barse, 2015 WL 600973, at *12.
92. Id. at *14.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *11–12.
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result.95 The court then cited Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M, discussed next, to
conclude that the birth mother may not use the nonbirth mothers’
noncompliance to strip her of parentage.96 Once again, the Barse court
focused on the legislative goal of giving children legitimate status whenever
possible in reaching its decision.97
In Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M, the New York court reviewed a case in
which the child was conceived using an anonymous sperm donor, in contrast
to the New York case of Q.M. discussed above.98 In Wendy G-M, the court
does address how the marital presumption applied to same-sex couples
intersects with the consent issue, stating that:
In response to the presumption created by marriage, the birth mother argues
before this court that if a biological stranger were presumed to be a parent,
the potential exists for a birth mother to have artificial insemination, without
the permission of the married spouse, and then the unknowing, nonbiological, marital partner could be “obligated for 21 years of support.” The
argument does not defeat the holding here. A consent, properly executed
and acknowledged under DRL § 73, is irrefutable. The presumption that
arises in this case-the presumption of a spouse’s consent to artificial
insemination-is not irrefutable. The marital consent presumed in this case
may be rebutted by either spouse in the same-sex marriage. The birthmother could produce evidence that she never intended her spouse to be the
parent of the AID child. The unknowing spouse would be faced with a
presumption of consent to parenthood by virtue of the marriage and would
have ample opportunity to rebut the presumption with evidence that the
birth mother failed to obtain any consent prior to the conception. The
unknowing, non-biological spouse, would be required to overcome the
presumption of consent, and prove lack of consent. 99

In holding that the marital presumption must apply to same-sex
nonbirth/nongenetic spouses, the G.M. court once again relied on the New
York law legalizing same-sex marriage and its necessary implications that all
the same benefits that flow from marriage extend to same-sex couples, not
simply the right to marry.100
The Marriage Equality Act swept away many of the sex-based distinctions
in New York’s Domestic Relations Law in the spirit of individuals making
their own choices in both entering and living a married life, free from
unreasonable restraints. Section 2 of the MEA mandates that not only
95. Id.
96. Id. at *6–7.
97. Id. at *8.
98. Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014); Q.M. v. B.C., 995
N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014).
99. Wendy G-M, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 859 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 860.
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statutes, but the common law as well, are gender neutral with respect to all
the legal benefits, obligations, etc. arising from marriage. DRL § 10–a(2).
In Laura WW. v. Peter WW., the Third Department predicated the husband’s
parental status on the fact of marriage, without regard to the husband’s
biological connection to the child or to his fertility in general. To impose
the presumption of consent to AID for couples in a heterosexual marriage,
but not for those in a same-sex one, when both are similarly situated, but for
sexual orientation, would reverse the gender-neutral approach to New
York’s families canonized in the MEA. In Laura WW. v. Peter WW., the
Third Department properly started New York down the path of presuming
that the child of either partner in a married same sex couple will be
presumed to be the child of both, even though the child is not genetically
linked to both parents. . . . . This court will not stop that march to greater
equality for all lawfully married couples. The pervasive and powerful
common law presumptions that link both spouses in a marriage to a child
born of the marriage-the presumption of legitimacy within a marriage and
the presumption of a spouse’s consent to artificial insemination-apply to this
couple. This court holds that the non-biological spouse is a parent of this
child under the common law of New York as much as the birth-mother.101

Finally, the Iowa Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gartner v. Iowa
Department of Public Health is particularly salient regarding how to extend
the marital presumption after that state’s highest court approved same-sex
marriage.102 In Gartner, a same-sex couple wanted to list the nonbirth/
nongenetic spouse’s name on their child’s birth certificate.103 The couple was
validly married when their child was born, as the Iowa Supreme Court
previously struck down its Defense of Marriage Act in Varnum v.
Brien.104 The Iowa Department of Health refused to put the nonbirth/
nongenetic spouse’s name on the child’s birth certificate because that spouse
had not adopted the child.105 The Department’s position was that, “[t]he
system for registration of births in Iowa currently recognizes the biological
and ‘gendered’ roles of ‘mother’ and ‘father,’ grounded in the biological fact
that a child has one biological mother and one biological father.”106 The
couple subsequently brought an action to have the nonbirth/nongenetic
spouse named as a parent on the birth certificate.107 The district court ordered
the department to do so, and the case went up on appeal to the Iowa Supreme
Court.108

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 860–61 (citations omitted).
See Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 353 (Iowa 2013).
See id. at 341–42.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 341–42.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
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After reciting the facts of the case, the court in Gartner laid out the
marital presumption in Iowa:
For purposes of preparing a birth certificate, the Code includes a
presumption of parentage. The legislature articulated the following
procedure for preparing a child’s birth certificate, based upon the
presumption of parentage:
If the mother was married at the time of conception, birth, or at any
time during the period between conception and birth, the name of
the husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the
child unless paternity has been determined otherwise by a court of
competent jurisdiction, in which case the name of the father as
determined by the court shall be entered by the department.
The statute is rebuttable under the preponderance standard “by clear,
strong and satisfactory evidence.” The challenging party must also
demonstrate a parental relationship with the child. Here, rebutting the
presumption is a nonissue, because Heather conceived Mackenzie using an
anonymous sperm donor.109

The Gartner court effectively lays out the origins and goals of the
martial presumption.110 This description is helpful in thinking about how to
link the presumption’s original intent and goals with the brave new world of
same-sex marriage and nonbirth/nongenetic spouses after Obergefell.111
The presumption of parentage is a fundamental legal construct
originating in common law.
....
Legislatures across the nation have adopted statutes codifying a
presumption of parentage in order to address several key social policies.
Specifically, “the presumption protected the legitimacy of children, which
in turn entitled them to the financial support, inheritance rights, and filiation
obligations of their parents.” It thwarted the possibility that children would
become wards of the state and promoted familial stability by preventing “a
third-party putative father from insinuating himself onto an intact family by
claiming to have sired one of the family’s children.” Moreover, at a time
when “genetic origins were more a matter of suspicion than science,” the
presumption served judicial efficiency by curtailing debates between
parents as to the biological nature of their parent–child relationship.

109. Id. at 344 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 344–48.
111. Id.
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Based on these social policies,. . . . [s]pecific to Iowa, our court long
ago articulated the principal bases for presuming a child born in wedlock is
the legitimate issue of the marital spouses:
“This rule is founded on decency, morality, and public policy. By
that rule, the child is protected in his inheritance and safeguarded
against future humiliation and shame. Likewise, under the rule,
the family relationship is kept sacred and the peace and harmony
thereof preserved. No one, by incompetent evidence, can malign
the virtue of the mother, and no one, by such evidence, can
interrupt the harmony of the family relationship and undermine the
sanctity of the home.”
Taking these policies individually, we recognize the strong stigma
accompanying illegitimacy. The presumption counteracts the stigma by
protecting the integrity of the marital family, even when a biological
connection is not present.112

While acknowledging all the benefits of the marital presumption, the
Gartner court found that the district court was wrong to extend those benefits
to same-sex marital couples simply by means of statutory interpretation.113
Iowa law on this point did not allow for a general neutral interpretation of the
marital presumption:
The district court interpreted section 144.13(2) to require the Department to
list Melissa as Mackenzie’s second parent on the birth certificate. We do
not agree the statute can be interpreted in this way.
....
A specific rule of construction found in Iowa Code section 4.1 applies
to statutes containing gendered terms and assists us in ascertaining the
legislature’s intent. Section 4.1 provides: “Words of one gender include the
other genders.” This is not, however, a blanket rule applicable to all types
of statutes. Instead, courts construing statutes can only utilize this rule when
the statute uses a specific type of gendered language.
When the statute refers to only one gender and the gender referenced is
masculine, section 4.1(17) extends the statute to include females. . . .
However, when the statute refers to only one gender and the gender
referenced is feminine, section 4.1(17) does not extend the scope of the
statute to include males. There, the court found that a husband could not
recover under a pension statute, because the court could not enlarge the term

112. Id. at 345–48 (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 341.
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“widow,” as it referred to the surviving spouse who was eligible for survivor
benefits, to include “widowers.”
Finally, when the statute employs both masculine and feminine words,
section 4.1(17) does not apply. Reading such a statute in a gender-neutral
manner “would destroy or change” the plain and unambiguous language,
and would “nullif[y] the intent of the Legislature.”
Iowa’s presumption of parentage statute expressly uses both masculine
and feminine words by referring to a mother, father, and husband.
Accordingly, section 4.1(17) does not apply. If we applied the rule and
imposed a gender-neutral interpretation of the presumption, we would
destroy the legislature’s intent to unambiguously differentiate between the
roles assigned to the two sexes. Only a male can be a husband or father.
Only a female can be a wife or mother. The legislature used plain and
unambiguous language to convey its intent. Thus, we cannot nullify the
intent of the legislature by finding otherwise through statutory construction.
Finally, the district court relied on our decision in Varnum to compel
its statutory construction analysis. At the time of enactment, the legislature
made a conscious choice to use the word “husband.” It could have chosen
to use spouse or other such language, but it did not. Varnum was decided
thirty-nine years after the legislature enacted section 144.13(2). Hence, it
is doubtful the legislature considered same-sex marriages when it enacted
section 144.13(2). Husband was an unambiguous term at the time of
passing section 144.13(2). Therefore, we cannot use the rules of statutory
construction to extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the plain meaning of
section 144.13(2).114

Unable to use statutory construction to gender-neutralize the marital
presumption, the Gartner court turned to constitutional means of doing so.115
The court looked to the state constitution’s equal protection guarantee.116
Harkening back to its decision in Varnum, the court stated:
Thus, with respect to the subject and purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws, we
find the Gartners similarly situated to married opposite-sex couples. The
Gartners are in a legally recognized marriage, just like opposite-sex couples.
The official recognition of their child as part of their family provides a basis
for identifying and verifying the birth of their child, just as it does for
opposite-sex couples. Additionally, married lesbian couples require
accurate records of their child’s birth, as do their opposite-sex counterparts.
The distinction for this purpose between married opposite-sex couples and
married lesbian couples does not exist and cannot defeat an equal protection
analysis. Therefore, with respect to the government’s purpose of

114. Id. at 348–50 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 344.
116. Id. at 351.
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identifying a child as part of their family and providing a basis for verifying
the birth of a child, married lesbian couples are similarly situated to spouses
and parents in an opposite-sex marriage.117

The Public Health Department argued that there were three important
governmental objectives in putting the male spouse’s name on a birth
certificate but refusing to do so for a nonbirth/nongenetic female spouse:
(1) the accuracy of birth certificates; (2) the efficiency and effectiveness of
government administration; and (3) the determination of paternity.118 The
court considered and dismissed each governmental interest in turn:
First, we understand that ensuring the accuracy of birth records for
identification of biological parents is a laudable goal. However, the present
system does not always accurately identify the biological father. When a
married opposite-sex couple conceives a child using an anonymous sperm
donor, the child’s birth certificate reflects the male spouse as the father, not
the biological father who donated the sperm. In that situation, the
Department is not aware the couple conceived the child by an anonymous
sperm donor.
Furthermore, the Department claims that the only way a married
lesbian couple, who uses an anonymous sperm donor to conceive the child,
can list the nonbirthing spouse as the parent on the birth certificate is to go
through an adoption proceeding. This will not make the birth certificate any
more accurate than applying the presumption of parentage for married
lesbian couples, because the birth certificate still will not identify the
biological father. The birth records of this state do not contain a statistical
database listing the children conceived using anonymous sperm donors.
Thus, the classification is not substantially related to the asserted
governmental purpose of accuracy.
The Department next asserts the refusal to apply the presumption of
parentage to nonbirthing spouses in lesbian marriages serves administrative
efficiency and effectiveness. The Department argues that it takes valuable
resources to reissue a birth certificate when a challenger successfully rebuts
the presumption of parentage. However, when couples use an anonymous
sperm donor, there will be no rebuttal of paternity. Moreover, even when
couples conceive without using an anonymous sperm donor, there is no
showing in the record that the presumption of paternity in opposite-sex
marriages is rebutted in a significant number of births.
....

117. Id.
118. Id.
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The third proffered reason for the Department’s action is the
government’s interest in establishing paternity to ensure financial support
of the child and the fundamental legal rights of the father. When a lesbian
couple is married, it is just as important to establish who is financially
responsible for the child and the legal rights of the nonbirthing spouse. 119

In the end, the Gartner court found that the marital presumption statute
violated the Iowa Constitution’s Equal Protection clause as applied to lesbian
couples, reiterating the import of the same-sex marriage case, not just that the
right to marry was upheld, but that all the benefits of marriage for the couple
and their children were to be extended as well:
It is important for our laws to recognize that married lesbian couples who
have children enjoy the same benefits and burdens as married opposite-sex
couples who have children. By naming the nonbirthing spouse on the birth
certificate of a married lesbian couple’s child, the child is ensured support
from that parent and the parent establishes fundamental legal rights at the
moment of birth. Therefore, the only explanation for not listing the
nonbirthing lesbian spouse on the birth certificate is stereotype or prejudice.
The exclusion of the nonbirthing spouse on the birth certificate of a child
born to a married lesbian couple is not substantially related to the objective
of establishing parentage.120

However, instead of striking down the statute, the court “preserve[d] it
as to married opposite-sex couples and require[d] the Department to apply
the statute to married lesbian couples.”121 The court affirmed the district
court and ordered the Department to issue a birth certificate naming Melissa
Gartner as the parent of Mackenzie Gartner.122 While that decision may make
people feel assured that the marital presumption will automatically apply to
same-sex spouses, several courts, as discussed above, have refused to extend
it to same-sex couples, even in states that allow same-sex marriage.123 Their
reasoning is grounded in the lack of fit between the original presumption
grounded in biology, and the structure of same-sex marriage, where two
parents cannot both be the biological parents of the children of the
marriage.124 So, any judicial or legislative resolution to extend the marital
presumption must involve a reconceptualization of the basis of the
presumption and moving it away from biology to presumed consent.125

119.
120.
121.
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Id. at 352–53.
Id. at 353–54.
Id. at 354.
See id.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
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V. SHIFTING THE FOUNDATION OF THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION FROM
BIOLOGY TO CONSENT
The theme sounded by the courts that refused to extend the marital
presumption to same-sex couples was that the marital presumption had its
origins in establishing that the husband of a couple was the biological father
of a child born to the wife during the marriage.126 Those courts cite the use
of the words “father” and “paternity” and the inclusion of exemptions for
husbands who were not physically or otherwise capable of fathering the child
as proof of this purpose.127 They focus less on the presumption’s goals of
having certainty for the child in terms of legitimacy, having two parents for
legal purposes, and the protection of the intact, marital family from external
intrusion.128 If those goals become the focus, then the following move from
biology to consent becomes consistent with the original purposes of the
marital presumption.129
The courts that extended the marital presumption to same-sex couples
have focused on the implications of case law validating same-sex marriage
and the import of the court’s reasoning in those cases.130 The state cases that
validated same-sex marriage prior to Obergefell focused on the dignity of the
marriage and the benefits to the children of the marriage.131 Instead of
focusing on only one of the original goals of the presumption, establishing a
surrogate for biology, these courts focus on the goal of legitimizing children
and extending benefits meant to flow from their state courts’ decision
allowing same-sex couples to marry.132 This shift in focus allows the second
group of courts to reach conclusions about the presumption grounded in the
law’s shift to recognize such marriages and the children who are within their
protective ambit.133
So there is a way to reconcile the original goals of the presumption with
Obergefell.134 If the focus is primarily on the role of the marital presumption
as a means to legitimize children, give a child two parents, and protect the
marital family—rather than as a surrogate for a biological connection to the
husband of a wife who gives birth—then there is a consistent reading of the
original intent of the marital presumption with Obergefell’s focus on
legitimizing children of same-sex couples and ensuring that all the benefits
of marriage extend to those children.135
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
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Rather than the legal fiction that the husband of every wife who bears a
child within marriage is the biological child of that man, the new presumption
would be grounded in the concept that presumes every spouse consents to a
child who is born during the marriage and intends that child to be his or hers,
unless evidence is presented to rebut the presumption of consent.136 A
spouse’s evidence of deception would be sufficient to rebut the
presumption.137 But evidence of a biological connection with someone
outside the marriage would not be sufficient—absent evidence of
deception.138
A. Inheritance Law
With the exception of Gartner, most of the cases discussed involved
divorce in the context of family law.139 In those cases, a same-sex female
couple was divorcing, and the nonbirth/nongenetic spouse was seeking
custody and/or visitation.140 These cases do not consider the marital
presumption in the context of inheritance law and distributing a decedent’s
estate after she has died.141 However, they do provide a place to begin the
analysis for inheritance law, although the goals of that area of law differ
markedly from family law in terms of the parent-focused nature of the cases
brought in family law.142 Gartner, in particular, provides a sound analytical
basis for extending the presumption in family law and inheritance law.143 In
inheritance law, rather than an adult seeking a declaration as the legal parent
of a child, it is the child who is seeking to establish the parent-child
relationship.144 The child seeks this determination of parentage, not for
caregiving purposes, but for eligibility to receive a share of the decedent’s
estate.145 If the language of Obergefell is taken seriously seriously—that the
dignity and protection of children of the family is of utmost importance in its
decision to extend marriage to same-sex couples—the focus should be on
protecting that child’s right to have two parents for all purposes, including
inheritance.146
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As noted above, American inheritance law is a status-based system.147
People inherit based on their relationship to the decedent.148 So establishing
a parent-child relationship is central to determining if a child will inherit from
a decedent.149 In the absence of an adjudication of the issue during life—
which would be dispositive—parentage issues may arise after someone has
died during the course of estate administration.150 The decedent may have
died intestate and the statute provides for the estate to go to “issue”, or
someone may have left a class gift in her will to her children or her son’s
children.151 In either case, there needs to be a quick, easy way to determine
parentage when it has not been adjudicated during life.152 The marital
presumption provides one way to efficiently make this determination at
death.153 Extending the marital presumption to same-sex nonbirth/
nongenetic spouses for purposes of inheritance law supports the goals of a
child having two legal parents from whom he or she can inherit and the
orderly administration of estates.154
An action in federal court striking down one of the state codifications of
the marital presumption that is not gender neutral could extend the marital
presumption to same-sex couples.155 For example, the Texas statute says, “A
man is presumed to be the father of a child if . . . he is married to the mother
of the child and the child is born during the marriage.”156 The marital
presumption could also be extended state by state via legislative action.157 In
keeping with that idea, the Uniform Probate Code could amend Article II to
add its own gender-neutral presumption akin to that found in the Arkansas
statutes: “A child born or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the
legitimate child of both spouses.”158
The Uniform Probate Code does not currently have its own
presumption; rather it incorporates the Uniform Parentage Act presumption
by reference.159 In addition to creating a gender-neutral presumption in the
147. See supra Parts I, IV.
148. Monopoli, Deadbeat, supra note 16, at 259.
149. See supra Part I.
150. See Monopoli, Deadbeat, supra note 16, at 259–60.
151. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 201.001–.003, 255.401 (West 2015).
152. See id.
153. See supra Part IV.
154. See supra Part IV.
155. Joan M. Burda, Obergefell v. Hodges: The Effect of the Decision and Estate Planning for LGBT
Couples, 87 N.Y. ST. B. J. 10, 12 (2015).
156. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(1) (West 2012).
157. See Burda, supra note 155, at 13–14.
158. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(a)(2) (2011).
159. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-115 Legislative Note: “States that have enacted the Uniform
Parentage Act (2000, as amended) should replace “applicable state law” in paragraph (5) with “Section
201(b)(1), (2), or (3) of the Uniform Parentage Act (2000), as amended”. Two of the principal features of
Articles 1 through 6 of the Uniform Parentage Act (2000, as amended) are (i) the presumption of paternity
and the procedure under which that presumption can be disproved by adjudication . . . ” I would also
advocate for the Uniform Probate Code to similarly create a gender-neutral presumption akin to the
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Uniform Probate Code itself, I would make the presumption conclusive.160
In family law, having a rebuttable presumption makes sense given the
profound implications of giving an adult the significant duties of parentage
during a child’s life.161 If a nonbirth spouse did not consent to being a parent,
the presumption should not apply.162 However, in inheritance law, making
the presumption conclusive or irrebuttable, as it was historically, makes more
sense.163 In inheritance law, the goal is to determine the eligible takers based
on their relationship to the decedent and move the assets to them as efficiently
as possible.164 Having a conclusive presumption accomplishes this goal.165
Such a rule would bring fairness to same-sex couples and stability, a
touchstone of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell, to their children.166
It would also bring state statutes in line with the spirit of Obergefell to
provide all the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples and their children.167
Finally, it would ensure that every child has two parents for purposes of
inheritance, and it would further the efficient, orderly administration of
estates, which are both major goals of American inheritance law.168

Uniform Parentage Act’s presumption in favor of nonmarital children as well so that marital status would
not be the exclusive means by which parentage could be determined. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§§ 204(a)(4) and (5).
160. See id.
161. See Monopoli, Nonmarital, supra note 15, at 880–84.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 880.
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